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This study investigates scale economies in European real estate companies.  We examine the effects of 
size on revenue, expense, profitability ratios and capital costs using panel data regression. We find that 
larger real estate companies in Europe are able to generate higher revenue per unit of company size, 
incur lower costs and produce higher returns. Net Operating Income ratios and return ratios increase 
while Selling, General and Administrative expense ratios decrease with the size of a company. However, 
we do not find evidence that larger companies have lower cost of debt or lower weighted average cost of 
capital. From our analysis, it is evident that particularly small firms can reap substantial economies of 
scale as they grow. However, the benefits of further growth tend to be much more modest for larger 
companies.  Given REITs are on average larger than comparable non-REITs this may explain why REITs 
have lower economies of scale in expenses and revenues than Non-REIT real estate companies.  
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The classic economies of scale argument with respect to real estate suggests that as real estate portfolios 
increase in size, the incremental cost of managing additional properties should fall (Ambrose, Highfield, & 
Linneman, 2005; Kim, 1986). This argument arises from two sources. First, fixed cost elements can be 
shared across properties, and second, that larger firms in fragmented markets have greater bargaining 
power. In addition, larger property companies should also have access to better debt terms and a lower 
cost of capital, as they have access to more finance sources (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 
1988).  
 
Real estate companies with larger property portfolios should be more efficient than those with smaller 
portfolios. As firms grow and add properties, costs should rise less than the increase in asset value under 
management. If this is the case, larger real estate companies should be more profitable, thus providing a 
rationale for mergers and acquisitions. However, isolating the effects of scale is challenging, as it is 
necessary to control for a large number of characteristics. To give just a few examples, a portfolio of older 
properties may incur higher expenditure, distance between management and their property portfolios 
may lead to inefficiencies or lower returns, companies differ in the extent to which development activities 
are part of their business model and in the extent that operational management is resourced internally, 
externally or in joint ventures etc. However, this study takes a systematic approach to the estimation of 
the effect of scale by taking into account country, sector and other potential drivers of differences across 
firms (to the extent that data is available). 
     
Whilst there are strong arguments that scale should offer benefits, counter arguments suggest that larger 
firms are subject to considerable diseconomies of scale. For example, they may find specialist resources 
are spread too thinly, which may lead to poorer decision-making. Larger companies also require 
additional resources to co-ordinate and manage activities that smaller companies can manage on an ad 
hoc basis. Larger companies may also get “conflicted out” of operating in certain markets. Finally, larger 
companies may find it hard to maintain the same passion, drive and incentivisation that smaller 
organisations can achieve. Consequently, it is far from clear that there will be a strong relationship 
between size and performance.    
 
While most previous studies have focused on the economies of scale for US Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), this study investigates economies of scale for European REITs/real estate companies. Unlike the 
US market, where the listed real estate market is more mature and consolidated, the European market is 
relatively new and has grown dramatically over the last two decades with its growth facilitated by the 
introduction of REIT regimes across European developed markets over the past 15 years.  Europe is a 
more fragmented market than the US with cultural differences and differences in leasing conventions and 
market norms across countries (and within countries) and this may make economies of scale harder to 
achieve than for US companies.  Previously, due to the limitations of data and the size of European real 
estate company universe, it was difficult to econometrically measure economies of scale. In this study, we 
obtain 2134 firm year observations using a sample of 232 listed European real estate companies across 
the period 2001 to 2015.  The richness of the dataset ensures a sufficient range of company size both 
cross-sectionally, and over time. Furthermore, we also have a sufficient number of mergers and 
acquisitions to test the effect of these on economies of scale.  
 
This study briefly summarises the related literature and the issues arising from it. We then consider 
economies of scales of European real estate companies using panel data regression. The results show that 
larger real estate companies tend to generate more revenue, incur lower costs and produce higher 
returns but there is no evidence that larger companies have lower cost of capital. Furthermore, REITs 
have lower economies of scale in expenses and revenue than non-REIT real estate companies after 


















2. Related Literature  
The limited size of the REIT/real estate company universe mean that the early studies of the 1970s and 
1980s struggled to find economies of scale. However, this is not uncommon across industries. As 
Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) point out, the ability to econometrically measure economies of 
scale often eludes the technology and data at hand. Indeed early studies suggested a “small firm effect” 
in US REITs, with smaller firms earning higher average returns than large firms (McIntosh, Liang and 
Tompkins, 1991). Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) give examples of economies of scale arising 
through industry consolidation and firm size in industries such as railroads, airlines, cement, steel, 
brewing, and oil and gas exploration.  
   
Economies of scale can arise from a variety of factors. Firstly, scale economies may exist in a firm’s cost of 
capital. For example, larger firms often issue equity and debt in greater amounts leading to lower 
underwriting spreads (Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992). Studies dating back to the 1960s document that 
larger firms have lower costs of raising new capital (Archer and Faerber, 1966). Secondly, scale 
economies are associated with greater operating efficiency and profitability. In support of the role of 
operating efficiencies, studies have shown that economies of scale in operations often result from 
horizontal consolidation within industries (Eckbo, 1992) implying that size leads to lower operating costs. 
In the real estate industry, Ambrose et al (2000) report that large REITs have higher net operating income 
(NOI) growth. In addition, Bers and Springer (1998) and Capozza and Seguin (1998) report evidence 
consistent with scale economies existing in REIT general and administrative (G&A) costs. For example, 
Capozza and Seguin (1998) note that REITs with higher property-level G&A expenses have lower 
shareholder’s return, suggesting the market penalises firms without sufficient scale economies.  
 
One of the problems with identifying economies of scale in empirical studies is that the econometric 
techniques and data are often not sufficient to uncover the effect (Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman, 
2005). For example, Ambrose et al (2000) report that their observed link between NOI growth and firm 
size is weak. Furthermore, Capozza and Seguin (2000) find results that are inconsistent with scale 
economies in G&A expenses, in contradiction to their earlier study (Capozza and Seguin, 1998). Although 
previous research seems to imply that economies of scale exist with respect to capital costs, Bers and 
Springer (1998) find small diseconomies of scale with respect to interest expense. Capozza and Seguin 
(2000) report a weak negative relationship between interest expense and firm size. Thus, the question of 
the existence of economies of scale in real estate companies remains an important question, particularly 
in the context of pressures for consolidation in the industry. 
 
Research from later in the 1990s and early 2000s using data from the 1990s such as Bers and Springer 
(1997), Capozza and Seguin (1998) and Ambrose and Linneman (2001) find evidence of scale economies. 
These studies distinguish between economies of scale in expenses and the impact of size on capital costs 
and scale effects on earnings growth potential. In terms of the various expense items (general and 
administrative (G&A), interest costs, management fees, other operating expenses), economies of scale 
are more evident in smaller expense items. Thus, these studies conclude that the gains from economies 
of scale are modest. Indeed Yang (2001), suggests that the non-linear nature of economies of scale 
entails diseconomies of scale for larger real estate companies. However, Ambrose, Highfield and 
Linneman (2005) find evidence to support a link between firm profitability and firm size. Additionally, 
they identifiy that large REITs have better prospects for further growth while succeeding at lowering their 
costs. Their evidence from the stochastic frontier analysis points to further efficiency gains from 
continued growth and consolidation in REITs. However, Miller et al. (2006), looking at similar time 
periods, find little evidence of scale economies in REITs. Feng, Mckay and Sirmans (2011) report that 
regulation changes in the 1980s and 1990s, which facilitated vertical integration and internal 
management led to consolidation and growth in the REIT industry in US. However, Topuz and Isik (2009) 
show that although efficiency increased during the 1990s, productivity declined and technology 
regressed. They further show that typical REITs gained efficiency and caught up with the ones applying 

















terms of operating efficiency during the 1990s. These new REITs are relatively innovative, large, focused 
on both product and location, self-managed, publicly traded, growth oriented, non-financial constrained, 
use less leverage and are rich with pre-entry learning experience. Xu and Ooi (2018) extend previous 
studies and looked at the growth of REITs between 1992 and 2012. They observe that large REITs with 
more free cash flows may engage in  growth activities, causing decreasing returns to scale.  All of these 
studies focus on US REITs.    
 
Whilst differences in costs can be observed across companies, what is not known is whether each firm is 
maximising its efficiency potential. Hence, any cost function derived for the entire industry could 
potentially be biased by these inefficiencies – as described by Anderson, Lewis, and Springer (2000). Any 
estimate of inefficiency needs to take into account the heterogeneity of both the businesses and the 
underlying real estate. REITs operating in markets where more inputs are required for the same level of 
revenue may erroneously be deemed inefficient and vice versa. If some companies (REITs) are sufficiently 
large to influence (output) prices, economic theory predicts that they will set prices above marginal cost 
to maximise profits. However, empirical tests of this hypothesis are inconclusive. For example, Ambrose 
et al (2000) find that REITs have a limited ability to influence rents. 
 
As REITs and companies merge, the costs of subsequent integration normally occur in the first year or so, 
while efficiencies are realized largely subsequently. Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans (2001) examined REIT 
mergers in the mid-1990s and found this pattern with  returns of target firms positive whilst acquirer firm 
returns are slightly negative. They highlighted that, whilst there may be scale economies, geographical 
diversification arising from mergers can dissipate some of these benefits. This impact of distance from 
assets has recently been researched by Eichholtz, Holdermans and Yonder (2015) again in a US context. 
They find that, particularly for lower quality office property, proximity matters with higher effective 
rents/occupancy rates being achieved by investors located close to their occupiers. Furthermore, real 
estate is a capital intensive business and previous research in the US has highlighted that larger firms are 
able to benefit from capital cost savings as highlighted by Linneman (1997) as a motivation for 
consolidation in the industry.  
 
The issues of how to estimate and distinguish economies of scale have been a subject of debate both 
with respect to real estate and in other industries. The banking industry for example has seen numerous 
studies of costs and profitability functions and their functional form. Berger and Mester (1997) note that 
a translog form is popular but other more flexible forms may provide a better fit for the data. The 
implication is that a linear form is likely to be overly restrictive.   
As previous studies have noted, there is no consensus on the best metric for scale – enterprise value, 
output, revenue, floor space and total assets are all possibilities. The measurement of real estate services 
output by statistical authorities is derived as revenue less inputs from other industries and services 
(Allcoat, 2014). This captures the revenue impact of higher value property (requiring more capital) and a 
broader service offer (requiring more labour and possibly more capital). Total assets or the value of real 
estate is another potential measure of scale. Valuation based measures across Europe make this method 
possible in a way it is less so in the US where assets are more commonly just recorded at book value. The 
amount of space available for lease can also be seen as having relevance to scale economies but has the 
drawback of not adjusting for quality (location, building quality, height etc.) even if adjusting for sector. 
Our analysis follows previous work - Altinkhe and Hansen (2000) and Ambrose, Highfield and Linneman 
(2005) - by estimating the effect of firm size on multiple dimensions of revenue, cost and profitability 
factors.    
In a study of private real estate funds, Krautz and Fuerst (2015) examine the relationship between size 
and success, noting market concentration in real estate funds is “above average relative to the finance 
industry and comparable to industries that require extensive capital investments in large-scale machinery, 
equipment, and technology”. Previous research indicates that performance is typically not sustained and 
in many cases the performance of previous funds is not clearly established. In line with signalling theory, 

















the more developed networks that larger managers have, this enables large companies to raise capital 
more successfully. This study did not find evidence that larger managers were able to turn this capital 
raising advantage into out-performance.  
    
Whilst there is some disagreement, studies of US REITs have generally indicated the following:   
• G&A expenses / revenue is lower for larger firms – consistent with operational efficiencies from 
scale. 
• Rental revenue as % of sales is not affected by size – there is little evidence of fundamentally 
different business models by size. 
• Net Operating Income (NOI)/revenue increases as firms grow (Funds From Operations (FFO) 
growth, total debt and property focus also important) but at slowing rate – reflecting that 
operational efficiency feeds through to net income. 
• Lower cap rates on larger firms – increased valuation of larger firms. 
• Larger firms have higher payout ratios (lower leverage firms also) 
• Return on Equity (ROE) is higher for larger firms – profitability increases with size 
• Larger firms have lower WACC and lower systematic risk 
The benefits of scale are likely to be reflected in greater operational efficiency (lower expense ratios), 
lower financing costs or an ability to drive higher revenue growth.  There has not been a recent study of 
European real estate companies to establish the extent to which these findings apply in a European 
context, this study addresses this gap and analyses the effect of size on revenue, expense, cost of capital 
and return of European REIT/real estate companies.  This study also extends previous studies by 
comparing size effects between REITs and non-REIT real estate companies. 
3. Data and Methodology 
We restrict our sample to European real estate companies with financial data available from the SNL REIT 
database and employ several selection criteria to capture companies with similar business models. First, 
we exclude homebuilders, hotel groups and debt investment companies since their business model is 
different from equity investors. Secondly, we exclude companies based in Europe that invest primarily in 
markets outside the European Economic Area (e.g. investing in Russia, Turkey and India etc.). Lastly, we 
exclude new start-up companies or companies that had their IPO during 2015, thus creating a sample of 
232 real estate companies/ REITs across Europe over the period 2001 to 2015.  
 
Previous studies on economies of scale assume firms produce homogenous products and the output is 
identifiable and quantifiable. In the case of REITs or real estate companies, firms invest in real estate and 
generate income and profits through the leasing of space. However, real estate is not homogenous and 
the diversity of activity across sectors and markets combined with a lack of comprehensive data on 
underlying portfolios makes comparison by volume of space owned or leased problematic. Thus, we 
employ two proxies for output: total enterprise value and total assets.  The summary statistics for all the 
variables are shown in Table 1. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the full sample. Panel B and C 
show the summary statistics for non-REIT real estate companies and REITs, respectively. REITs on average 
are larger, have higher returns, higher revenues, higher costs, lower leverage ratios, lower short term 
debt ratios, lower asset growth, lower interest expense to total debt ratios, and higher Weighted Average 




















Variable Mean Median Min Max SD N 
Panel A: Full sample       
Log(EV) 6.67  6.80  0.59  10.63  1.51  2134 
Log(Asset) 6.84  6.97  1.36  10.55  1.45  2134 
ROE (%) 6.10  6.98  -49.79  49.81  13.97  1827 
ROA (%) 3.02  2.99  -27.93  28.87  6.41  1827 
NOI/Market Cap (%) 9.38  8.72  -490.74  436.70  28.93  1830 
NOI/Total Asset (%) 3.45  3.88  -59.75  30.00  3.43  1830 
SG&A Expenses/Total Asset (%) 1.70  1.02  0.00  39.62  2.27  2126 
Total Cost / Asset (%) 5.09  4.37  0.03  34.36  3.16  1747 
Total Debt/ Total Cap (%) 50.39  50.71  0.00  101.02  21.21  1826 
ST Debt/ Debt (%) 18.16  9.31  0.00  100.00  23.96  1777 
Asset Growth (%) 16.19  5.74  -75.04  957.93  57.94  1667 
Interest Expense/Debt (%) 4.49  4.30  0.00  36.50  2.32  1814 
WACC (%) 4.22  4.07  0.80  17.95  1.81  1706 
REIT (Binary) 0.33  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.47  2134 
MABidder (Binary) 0.08  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.26  2134 
Panel B: Non-REIT real estate companies       
Log(EV) 6.45 6.63 0.59 10.19 1.53 1434 
Log(Asset) 6.64 6.85 1.36 10.34 1.47 1434 
ROE (%) 5.47 6.34 -49.79 49.81 14.61 1193 
ROA (%) 2.51 2.62 -27.93 21.51 6.22 1193 
NOI/Market Cap (%) 8.78 8.77 -490.74 436.70 34.76 1212 
NOI/Total Asset (%) 3.14 3.59 -59.75 30.00 4.01 1212 
SG&A Expenses/Total Asset (%) 1.97 1.22 0.00 39.62 2.58 1432 
Total Cost / Asset (%) 5.64 4.91 0.03 34.36 3.48 1144 
Total Debt/ Total Cap (%) 52.91 53.99 0.00 101.02 22.01 1212 
ST Debt/ Debt (%) 20.03 9.67 0.00 100.00 26.02 1173 
Asset Growth (%) 18.45 5.68 -75.04 957.93 68.01 1091 
Interest Expense/Debt (%) 4.77 4.51 0.00 36.50 2.58 1216 
WACC (%) 3.99 3.73 0.80 17.00 1.83 1129 
MABidder (Binary) 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.26 1434 
Panel C: REITs       
Log(EV) 7.13 7.17 2.63 10.63 1.35 700 
Log(Asset) 7.25 7.23 3.51 10.55 1.30 700 
ROE (%) 7.31 7.72 -42.91 44.24 12.60 634 
ROA (%) 3.97 3.72 -25.28 28.87 6.66 634 
NOI/Market Cap (%) 10.56 8.52 -29.63 129.67 10.35 618 
NOI/Total Asset (%) 4.07 4.22 -5.75 7.28 1.69 618 
SG&A Expenses/Total Asset (%) 1.15 0.68 0.00 11.12 1.29 694 
Total Cost / Asset (%) 4.06 3.71 0.68 17.52 2.07 603 
Total Debt/ Total Cap (%) 45.42 45.86 0.00 98.00 18.57 614 
ST Debt/ Debt (%) 14.52 8.22 0.00 100.00 18.83 604 
Asset Growth (%) 11.93 5.93 -45.69 289.37 30.50 576 
Interest Expense/Debt (%) 3.93 4.01 0.00 13.43 1.55 598 
WACC (%) 4.69 4.55 0.82 17.95 1.68 577 
MABidder (Binary) 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 700 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. ROE is the return on equity. ROA is the return on asset. NOI/Market Cap is the net operating income as a percentage 
of the market capitalisation. NOI/Asset is the net operating income as a percentage of the total asset. SG&A Expenses/Total 
Asset is Selling, General and Administrative expenses as a percentage of total assets. Total Cost / Asset is the sum of selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expense, rental operating expenses and interest expense as percentage of total assets. 
Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a percentage of the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of 
the book value of short-term debt to the book value of total debt. Asset Growth is the growth in the book value of total 
assets over the previous year. Interest Expense/Debt is the interest expense as a percentage of the book value of the total 
debt. WACC is the weighted average cost of capital. REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is a REIT in the 




















To examine the size effect on the outcome variable Y (expenses and revenues respectively in the two 
estimations) of real estate companies, we specify the following model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
2)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
We use selling, general and administration (SG&A) expenses as a percentage of total asset and total cost1 
as a percentage of asset as the measures of expenses of real estate companies. We use net operating 
income (NOI) as a percentage of market capitalisation and NOI as a percentage of total asset as the 
measures of revenues of real estate companies. If economies of scale exist, we should find that revenue 
measures increase and expense measures decline as size increases. We also include the square of the size 
to capture any non-linear size effects. Since REIT status has tax benefits and requires companies to 
distribute most of their earnings as dividends, the behaviour of a REIT might be different from a Non-REIT 
real estate company. Thus, we include a dummy variable REIT2 and its interactions with size to examine 
whether size effects are different between REITs and non-REIT real estate companies. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes a set of 
control variables which are described in Table 1.  
 
To examine the size effect on return of real estate companies and cost of capital respectively, we estimate 
the following equation: 
 
𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
2)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
 
We use return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) as the measures of profitability of real estate 
companies. As in the previous estimations, we would interpret higher returns  as an indication of 
economies of scale.  
 
Since real estate is a capital-intensive industry, the cost of capital could be an important factor that 
determines the performance of real estate companies. We employ two measures for the cost of capital: 
interest expenses as a percentage of total debt and WACC which is estimated as follows:3 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑘𝑑 (
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸






 𝑘𝑑 and 𝑘𝑠 represent the cost of debt (D) and the cost of equity (E), respectively. We estimate the cost of 
debt as the ratio of interest expenses to book value of debt (D). The market value of equity (E) is the 
company’s market capitalisation. Given the relatively short period many real estate companies or REITs 
have traded publicly, obtaining sufficient returns data to calculate a stable beta is problematic. 
Furthermore, we found a significant number of negative betas by using available historical returns. Thus, 





+ 𝑔 (6) 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉 represents the total dividends declared, E is the equity market capitalisation, and g is the projected 
growth rate. In order to proxy for the projected growth rate, we average the previous two years dividend 
growth rate, and the previous year’s dividend growth rate is estimated by the weighted average dividend 
growth rate over all companies which pay dividend in our sample.4. 
                                                             
1
 Total cost is the sum of SG&A expenses, operating rental expenses and interest expenses 
2
 In order to get the accurate date of conversion, all the conversion dates are collected from the company’s financial report 
or website. REIT is a dummy variable takes value of 1 if the he company is REIT current year.  
3
 Due to the poor coverage of preferred stock dividend for the European real estate companies, we assume here company 
only issue common stock and debt.  
4
 For example, the projected dividend growth rate for year 2006 is estimated by averaging of the weighted average dividend 


















We employ panel regression to estimate equations (1)-(4), the choice of fixed or random effect5 is guided 
by the Hausman test.  Property investments across time, sectors and countries differ in terms of their 
historic development, lease structures, services offer and regulations. We include year, sector and country 
dummies as control variables. The distribution of our sample across time is shown in Figure 1, most of our 
sample is between 2006 and 2015. Our sample consists of companies based in 19 European countries 
with the UK comprising around 37% of observations. Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of our sample 
across countries and property type, respectively. We note that most of the European REITs or real estate 
companies are diversified across property type, unlike in United States where there are a substantial 
number of companies who are focused on one property type. Figure 4 shows the sample distribution of 
REITs and non-REIT real estate companies across time. The proportion of REITs has increased since 2007, 
the year the UK introduced REITs which make up a sizable proportion of our European sample. Figure 5 
shows the distribution of the log of the total enterprise value in our sample. The distribution is slightly left 
skewed and the sample of real estate companies has a wide range of total enterprise values. 
 
We further control for leverage and growth. Growth is captured by asset growth rate, whereas leverage is 
captured by total debt as a percentage of total firm capitalisation and short-term debt as a percentage of 
total debt. The real estate industry is not static as merger and acquisition (M&A) activities occur over 
time. Firms could acquire assets or other real estate companies to achieve economies of scale.  We 
control for corporate acquisition activity with a dummy variable which equals 1 if the company is a bidder 
for and purchaser of shares of other real estate companies (including private companies) at any point in 
the sample period.  
 
 
Figure 1: Sample distribution of companies across time 
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Figure 2: Sample distribution of company years by country 
 
 























































































































































































Figure 4: Sample distribution of REIT and Non-REIT real estate companies across time 
 
 
Figure 5: Sample distribution of log (Total Enterprise Value) 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 provides the panel regression results for the impact of size on the expense ratios of real estate 
companies. Since total asset is used as a denominator for the expense measures, only total enterprise 
value is used as a size measure. The results show evidence of economies of scale in SG&A expenses. The 
negative and significant coefficient for firm size and the significantly positive coefficient for the quadratic 
total enterprise value indicates a significant effect of firm size. SG&A expenses decrease with firm size but 
at a decreasing rate.   The rate of decrease depends on the size of the firm e.g. at 100 million, 500 million, 
1 billion and 5 billion Euros total enterprise value. A 1% increase in total enterprise value is associated 
with a decrease in SG&A/Asset of 0.98, 0.58, 0.41 and 0.01 basis points, respectively, reflecting a 
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SG&A/Asset ratio is estimated at just under €6bn over the 2001-15 period. The existence of economies of 
scale in the expense measures is in line with evidence from US REITs presented by Ambrose, Highfield and 
Linneman (2005). The predicted SG&A Expenses/Assets ratio from the regression is illustrated in Figure 6 
below.6 We observe that firms can achieve substantial economies of scale when firms are small, but when 
the firm’s total enterprise value grows beyond 6 billion euros, firms are experiencing slight diseconomies 
of scale, Yang (2001) also finds these diseconomies of scale. No size effects were detected for total cost 
which consists of SG&A expense, interest expense and rental operating expense. The insignificant 
coefficient for size indicates that there is no size effect on the sum of interest expense and rental 
operating expense.7 
  
The results show that the size effect on SG&A/Asset is different between REITs and non-REIT real estate 
companies. REITs on average have a lower SG&A expenses ratio than non-REIT real estate companies. The 
coefficient for log(EV) and Log(EV) x REIT are -2.125 and 1.794 respectively. This implies the coefficient of 
log(EV) for REIT is -0.331. As firm size gets larger, SG&A expenses decrease less for REIT than for Non-REIT 
real estate companies. The coefficient for Log(EV)2 and Log(EV)2  x REIT are 0.124 and -0.12, respectively. 
This implies that the coefficient of Log(EV)2 for REIT is only 0.004 and indicates that SG&A expenses 
decline at a lower rate for REITs than they decline for Non-REIT real estate companies. 
 
 
Figure 6: Predicted SG&A Expenses/Total Assets by Size of Firm 
 
Turning to the impact of acquisitions, we find evidence that acquisitions in the previous year increase 
SG&A expense and total cost ratios. SG&A expense ratios decrease with the total debt to total 
capitalisation ratio.  This indicates that more highly leveraged firms operate more efficiently. A possible 
explanation is that given the pressure from debt servicing, they have more focus on SG&A expense. The 
total cost to total asset ratio increases with leverage, measured by the total debt to total capitalisation 
ratio. Combining the results, we conclude that although high leverage firms operate more efficiently by 
reducing SG&A expenses, the increase in interest expenses is more than offset by efficiency gains and 
leads to an increase in total cost ratios. Finally, asset growth is associated with a decrease in SG&A 
expense and total cost. Faster growing companies appear to be able to spread costs and lower the cost 
per asset. 
 
Table 3 provides the panel regression results for the impact of size on two revenue related metrics of real 
estate companies: NOI as a percentage of market capitalisation and NOI as a percentage of total assets. 
                                                             
6
 The prediction assumes all other variables at mean value.  
7
 We also undertook regression analysis on other cost (interest expense+ rental operating expense) / asset and rental 
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When total assets is used as the denominator for the revenue measurements, only total enterprise value 
is used for size measure. Overall, the results show evidence of economies of scale in revenue. For the 
NOI/Market Cap estimations, we find significant positive coefficients for both firm size measures and 
significant negative coefficient for the quadratic size effect. NOI ratios increase with firm size but at a 
decreasing rate. The rate of increase depends on the size of the firm.  A 1% increase in total enterprise 
value is associated with an increase in NOI/Market Cap of 11.4, 4.9, 2 and -4.5 basis points, respectively.  
From the regression results, the optimum total enterprise value is around 1.7 billion Euros. Looking at the 
estimations using total assets, the rate of increase in NOI/Market Cap depends on the size of the firm e.g. 
at 100 million, 500 million, 1 billion and 5 billion Euros total asset, 1% increase in total asset is associated 
with an increase NOI/Market Cap by 10.3, 6.3, 4.6 and 0.6 basis points, respectively. The optimum total 
asset to achieve the highest NOI/Market Cap is around 6.5 billion Euros. This result can either be mean 
that larger firms have a lower valuation (higher cap rate) reflecting market views of growth prospects or 
that larger firms are better able to deliver NOI and/or are less dependent on trading and development to 
deliver income to shareholders. Similar results are found for NOI/Asset, NOI/Asset increase with firm size 
but at a decreasing rate as firm size increases. The rate of increase depends on the size of the firm. A 1% 
increase in total assets is generally associated with an increase in NOI/Market Cap of 2.66, 1.59, 1.12 and 
0.05 basis points, respectively. The optimum total enterprise value to achieve the highest NOI/Asset is 
5410 million Euros. REITs on average can generate higher NOI than non-REIT real estate companies. The 
results also indicate that NOI increases less for REITs than for non-REIT real estate companies. Thus, REITs 
seem to have lower economies of scale in NOI than non-REIT real estate companies.  
 
There is evidence that acquiring assets in the previous year has a positive effect on NOI/Market Cap, but 
no effect on NOI/Asset. These results indicate that acquiring assets in previous year is associated with a 
decrease in the market capitalisation. Total debt to total capitalisation ratio and asset growth have a 
negative effect on NOI/Asset, but no effect on NOI/Market Cap. High leverage and faster growth generate 
lower NOI and reduce the market capitalisation at the same time.  
 
As larger real estate companies tend to generate higher revenue and incur lower costs, they should 
outperform smaller companies, all else equal. Table 5 provides the panel regression results for the impact 
of size on the return of the real estate companies. The results show evidence of economies of scale in 
return. We find significant positive coefficients for firm size and insignificant coefficients for the quadratic 
terms. The results suggest that a 1% increase in total enterprise value is associated with an increase in 
ROE and ROA of 9.7 and 5 basis points respectively and that a 1% increase in total asset is associated with 
an increase of ROE by 11.1 basis points. Interestingly, although the size effect between REIT and non-REIT 
real estate companies are different in expense and revenue, there is no difference in return. Acquiring 
assets in both the current and previous year has no significant impact on returns either. Returns decrease 
with leverage as measured by the total debt to total capitalisation ratio, thus more highly leveraged firms 
deliver lower returns. This result is consistent with other studies, notably Ambrose, Highfield, & Linneman 
(2005). Return also decreases with the short-term debt to total debt ratio as long-term financing is 
associated with higher returns. Furthermore, stronger asset growth is also associated with higher returns.  
 
Table 6 provides the panel regression results for the impact of size on the cost of capital. These results 
coincide with Bers and Springer (1998) who find small diseconomies of scale with interest expense. 
Similarly, we expect larger firms to have lower weighted average cost of capital since larger firms are 
typically seen as less risky. But none of our estimations show this correlation. Although the size effect on 
cost of debt does not differ between REITs and non-REIT real estate companies, REITs on average have a 
higher WACC than non-REIT real estate companies and the WACC of REITs decreases with firm size but at 
a decreasing rate. The cost of debt increases if the company acquired assets in the previous year, but the 
acquisition has no effect on WACC. There is no evidence in our results that leverage increases the cost of 
debt, but WACC increases with leverage, indicating the cost of equity increases with leverage as the firm 
becomes riskier. Furthermore, the cost of debt and WACC decrease with higher asset growth.   
 
In conclusion, our analysis presents evidence of economies of scale for real estate companies. Whilst we 

















generate higher NOI and incur lower SG&A expenses, thus generating higher returns. REITs tend to exhibit 
lower economies of scale in NOI and SG&A expenses than their non-REIT real estate counterparts. While 
the size effect on return and cost of debt does not differ between REITs and non-REIT real estate 
companies, there appear to be economies of scale in WACC for REITs.  
 
Table 2: Expense Measures 
 (1) (2) 
 SG&A/Asset Total Cost/Asset 
Log(EV) -2.125*** -1.879 
 (-3.25) (-1.63) 
Log(EV)
2
 0.124*** 0.076 
 (2.61) (0.95) 
Log(EV)*REIT 1.794** 1.927 
 (2.54) (1.46) 
Log(EV)
2
*REIT -0.120** -0.121 
 (-2.43) (-1.34) 
REIT -6.408*** -7.093 
 (-2.59) (-1.51) 
MABidder 0.075 0.008 
 (0.88) (0.05) 
MABiddert-1 0.151* 0.353** 
 (1.89) (2.47) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap -0.014*** 0.014** 
 (-3.71) (2.07) 
ST Debt/ Debt 0.003 0.009 
 (1.31) (1.34) 
Asset Growth -0.003*** -0.010*** 
 (-3.60) (-6.11) 
Intercept 13.290*** 16.392*** 
 (5.91) (4.00) 
Year Control Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes 
N 1346 1346 
Adj. R2 0.769 0.690 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. SG&A Expenses/Total Asset is Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses as a percentage of total assets. Total Cost / Asset is the sum of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
expense, rental operating expenses and interest expense as percentage of total assets. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book 
value of total debt as a percentage of the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term 
debt to the book value of total debt. Asset Growth is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. 
REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 


















Table 3: Revenue Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 NOI/Market Cap NOI/Market Cap NOI/Asset 
Log(EV) 30.135***  5.725*** 
 (3.15)  (2.62) 
Log(EV)
2
 -2.033***  -0.333** 
 (-2.96)  (-2.43) 
Log(EV)*REIT -20.165***  -3.727** 
 (-2.88)  (-2.24) 
Log(EV)
2
*REIT 1.356***  0.241** 
 (2.78)  (2.07) 
Log(Asset)  21.708*  
  (1.91)  
Log(Asset)
2
  -1.237*  
  (-1.65)  
Log(Asset)*REIT  -15.375**  
  (-2.06)  
Log(Asset)
2
*REIT  0.998**  
  (1.97)  
REIT 70.188*** 55.588** 14.390** 
 (2.86) (2.09) (2.45) 
MABidder -4.420 -5.059* -0.309 
 (-1.57) (-1.77) (-1.38) 
MABiddert-1 4.462*** 3.929** 0.284 
 (2.84) (2.53) (1.63) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap 0.068 0.047 -0.026* 
 (0.59) (0.39) (-1.69) 
ST Debt/ Debt 0.073 0.069 0.004 
 (0.70) (0.66) (0.58) 
Asset Growth -0.007 -0.002 -0.003* 
 (-0.80) (-0.30) (-1.71) 
Intercept -102.963*** -83.123** -17.768** 
 (-3.15) (-2.02) (-1.98) 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes 
N 1623 1623 1623 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.341 0.404 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. NOI/Market Cap is the net operating income as a percentage of the market capitalisation. NOI/Asset is the net 
operating income as a percentage of the total asset. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a percentage of 
the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term debt to the book value of total debt. Asset 
Growth is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is an acquirer in the 




















Table 4: Return Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ROE ROE ROA 
Log(EV) 9.680**  5.045** 
 (2.36)  (2.33) 
Log(EV)
2
 -0.354  -0.208 
 (-1.17)  (-1.36) 
Log(EV)*REIT 3.447  3.497 
 (0.65)  (0.82) 
Log(EV)
2
*REIT -0.315  -0.248 
 (-0.83)  (-0.87) 
Log(Asset)  10.114**  
  (2.25)  
Log(Asset)
2
  -0.378  
  (-1.22)  
Log(Asset)*REIT  7.874  
  (1.25)  
Log(Asset)
2
*REIT  -0.595  
  (-1.37)  
REIT -5.702 -22.245 -10.660 
 (-0.32) (-0.99) (-0.68) 
MABidder 1.389 1.401 0.382 
 (1.33) (1.34) (0.90) 
MABiddert-1 0.180 0.221 0.005 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.01) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap -0.276*** -0.313*** -0.130*** 
 (-8.52) (-9.27) (-8.98) 
ST Debt/ Debt -0.044** -0.045** -0.011 
 (-2.37) (-2.38) (-1.41) 
Asset Growth 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.018*** 
 (3.36) (3.36) (3.30) 
Intercept -37.232** -37.598** -20.254*** 
 (-2.55) (-2.25) (-2.59) 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes 
N 1550 1550 1550 
Adj. R2 0.466 0.465 0.487 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. ROE is the return on equity. ROA is the return on asset. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a 
percentage of the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term debt to the book value of 
total debt. Asset Growth is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. REIT is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is an 


















Table 5: Capital Cost Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cost of debt Cost of debt WACC WACC 
Log(EV) -0.069  0.451  
 (-0.08)  (0.83)  
Log(EV)
2
 -0.020  -0.039  
 (-0.33)  (-0.99)  
Log(EV)*REIT 0.817  -2.508***  
 (0.60)  (-2.79)  
Log(EV)
2
*REIT -0.047  0.156***  
 -0.069  0.451  
Log(Asset)  -0.012  0.793 
  (-0.01)  (1.08) 
Log(Asset)
2
  -0.017  -0.061 
  (-0.23)  (-1.22) 
Log(Asset)*REIT  1.201  -1.597 
  (0.69)  (-1.64) 
Log(Asset)
2
*REIT  -0.068  0.100 
  (-0.65)  (1.52) 
REIT -3.753 -5.437 10.388*** 6.813* 
 (-0.67) (-0.75) (3.11) (1.92) 
MABidder -0.176 -0.186 0.016 0.021 
 (-1.37) (-1.45) (0.13) (0.18) 
MABiddert-1 0.251* 0.242* 0.150 0.154 
 (1.87) (1.79) (1.34) (1.42) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap -0.011 -0.009 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (-1.33) (-1.14) (5.64) (5.72) 
ST Debt/ Debt -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.10) (-0.09) (0.71) (0.80) 
Asset Growth -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.35) (-4.45) (-4.31) (-4.30) 
Intercept 6.669** 6.087 2.108 0.802 
 (2.22) (1.45) (1.08) (0.30) 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1385 1385 1385 1385 
Adj. R2 0.359 0.358 0.507 0.504 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. ROE is the return on equity. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a percentage of the total 
capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term debt to the book value of total debt. Asset Growth 
is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. Cost of debt is the interest expense as a percentage of 
the book value of the total debt. WACC is the weighted average cost of capital. REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is an acquirer in the 
current year. t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
5. Robustness Check 
Our sample includes real estate companies with assets between €3.9 million and €38.1 billion. Within 
the sample, there are 153 firm-year observations with assets under €100 million. Among those 153 firm-
year observations, 139 observations are non-REIT real estate companies with average assets of €44.9 
million and 14 observations are REITs with average assets of €57.0 million.  The evidence of economies of 
scale might be caused by those small companies. In this section, we drop all the firm-year observations 
associated with companies with assets of under €100 million and re-run all the models as a robustness 
check. Table 6 shows the robustness check of expense measures. The results are broadly consistent with 

















smaller compared to the full sample regression. Furthermore, the quadratic terms become insignificant.  
In the full sample, because of the large coefficient of the size effect on SG&A expenses, SG&A expenses 
fall rapidly with size initially and the impact on predicted SG&A expenses as illustrated in Figure 6.   Next, 
Figure 7 displays the prediction based on firms with assets greater than €100m. This shows a shallower 
curve initially compared to Figure 6 and there are no diseconomies of scale across the range of total 
enterprise values in our sample.  REITs on average still have lower SG&A expenses than non-REIT real 
estate companies, but there is no evidence of economies of scale for REITs. Since the coefficient for 
log(EV) and Log(EV) x REIT are -0.952 and 0.967, respectively, this implies the coefficient of log(EV) for 
REIT is 0.011.  
 
 
Figure 7: Predicted SG&A Expenses/Total Assets by Size of Firm  
 
 
Table 7 shows the robustness check of revenue measures. The economies of scale in revenue disappears. 
It therefore appears that economies of scale in revenue mainly come from those companies with asset 
under €100 million. Table 8 shows the robustness check for return measures. There are still economies of 
scale in return, but the quadratic term becomes insignificant. There appears no difference in the size 
effect between REITs and non-REIT real estate companies.  Table 9 shows the robustness check for capital 
cost measures. The results confirm the conclusion of the full sample analysis. No economies of scale are 
detected in either cost of debt or WACC. The economies of scale in WACC for REITs disappear, implying a 
reduction of WACC for larger firms mainly stems from smaller REITs with assets under €100 million.  
 
In general, our robustness check results are consistent with the full sample estimations except for the 
revenue measures. Companies with asset under €100 million can indeed achieve substantial economies 
of scale in SG&A expense and NOI. Furthermore, the difference in the size effect between REITs and non-
REIT real estate companies disappears once companies under €100 million are excluded. Since most of 
the companies we exclude are non-REIT real estate companies, the difference in the size effect between 
REITs and non-REIT real estate companies in the full sample analysis is mainly caused by those non-REIT 
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Table 6: Expense measures – exclude firms with asset under 100 million Euros.  
 (1) (2) 
 SG&A/Asset Total Cost/Asset 
Log(EV) -0.952** -0.232 
 (-2.13) (-0.26) 
Log(EV)
2
 0.042 -0.036 
 (1.30) (-0.57) 
Log(EV)*REIT 0.967* 0.720 
 (1.72) (0.66) 
Log(EV)
2
*REIT -0.064 -0.040 
 (-1.61) (-0.53) 
REIT -3.641* -2.984 
 (-1.84) (-0.76) 
MABidder 0.033 -0.057 
 (0.40) (-0.39) 
MABiddert-1 0.118 0.313** 
 (1.55) (2.25) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap -0.012*** 0.010** 
 (-4.28) (2.25) 
ST Debt/ Debt 0.005** 0.008*** 
 (2.58) (2.64) 
Asset Growth -0.002*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.97) (-8.05) 
Intercept 8.963*** 10.691*** 
 (5.73) (3.35) 
Year Control Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes 
N 1279 1279 
Adj. R2 0.779 0.750 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. SG&A Expenses/Total Asset is Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses as a percentage of total assets. Total Cost / Asset is the sum of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
expense, rental operating expenses and interest expense as percentage of total assets. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book 
value of total debt as a percentage of the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term 
debt to the book value of total debt. Asset Growth is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. 
REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 


















Table 7: Revenue measures – exclude firms with asset under 100 million Euros 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 NOI/Market Cap NOI/Market Cap NOI/Asset 
Log(EV) 2.429  1.731 
 (0.21)  (1.33) 
Log(EV)
2
 0.043  -0.075 
 (0.06)  (-0.89) 
Log(EV)*REIT -3.136  -1.304 
 (-0.32)  (-1.13) 
Log(EV)
2
*REIT 0.154  0.066 
 (0.24)  (0.86) 
Log(Asset)  -16.712  
  (-1.10)  
Log(Asset)
2
  1.376  
  (1.52)  
Log(Asset)*REIT  9.476  
  (0.81)  
Log(Asset)
2
*REIT  -0.694  
  (-0.90)  
REIT 15.441 -29.190 6.292 
 (0.44) (-0.67) (1.50) 
MABidder -5.943* -6.221* -0.339** 
 (-1.81) (-1.85) (-2.00) 
MABiddert-1 3.087* 2.881* 0.235 
 (1.89) (1.79) (1.64) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap 0.382*** 0.369*** -0.012 
 (3.63) (3.13) (-0.85) 
ST Debt/ Debt 0.107 0.108 -0.006 
 (0.70) (0.71) (-0.90) 
Asset Growth -0.009 -0.009 -0.004*** 
 (-1.26) (-1.15) (-3.11) 
Intercept -76.494 38.989 -1.668 
 (-1.30) (0.67) (-0.31) 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes 
N 1279 1279 1279 
Adj. R2 0.318 0.319 0.530 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. NOI/Market Cap is the net operating income as a percentage of the market capitalisation. NOI/Asset is the net 
operating income as a percentage of the total asset. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a percentage of 
the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term debt to the book value of total debt. Asset 
Growth is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is an acquirer in the 


















Table 8: Return measures – excluding firms with asset under 100 million Euros 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ROE ROE ROA 
Log(EV) 13.748**  7.539** 
 (2.05)  (2.28) 
Log(EV)
2
 -0.615  -0.352 
 (-1.32)  (-1.56) 
Log(EV)*REIT 1.937  -0.392 
 (0.23)  (-0.09) 
Log(EV)
2
*REIT -0.212  0.006 
 (-0.37)  (0.02) 
Log(Asset)  12.450*  
  (1.87)  
Log(Asset)
2
  -0.503  
  (-1.11)  
Log(Asset)*REIT  9.120  
  (1.04)  
Log(Asset)
2
*REIT  -0.670  
  (-1.13)  
REIT -0.401 -27.240 3.705 
 (-0.01) (-0.85) (0.23) 
MABidder 0.493 0.468 0.328 
 (0.44) (0.42) (0.71) 
MABiddert-1 -1.007 -1.031 -0.275 
 (-0.97) (-1.00) (-0.58) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap -0.265*** -0.304*** -0.139*** 
 (-7.20) (-7.98) (-7.90) 
ST Debt/ Debt -0.043** -0.042** -0.011 
 (-2.18) (-2.10) (-1.40) 
Asset Growth 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.018*** 
 (2.84) (2.83) (2.88) 
Intercept -52.835** -48.013** -30.068** 
 (-2.17) (-1.96) (-2.46) 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes 
N 1229 1229 1229 
Adj. R2 0.491 0.492 0.505 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. ROE is the return on equity. ROA is the return on asset. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a 
percentage of the total capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term debt to the book value of 
total debt. Asset Growth is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. REIT is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is an 


















Table 9: Capital Cost measures– exclude firms with asset under 100 million Euros.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cost of debt Cost of debt WACC WACC 
Log(EV) -1.354  -1.088  
 (-1.15)  (-1.11)  
Log(EV)
2
 0.065  0.068  
 (0.83)  (1.00)  
Log(EV)*REIT 1.942  -1.231  
 (1.20)  (-1.11)  
Log(EV)
2
*REIT -0.121  0.069  
 (-1.19)  (0.93)  
Log(Asset)  -1.463  -0.441 
  (-0.77)  (-0.40) 
Log(Asset)
2
  0.078  0.023 
  (0.63)  (0.31) 
Log(Asset)*REIT  2.435  -0.561 
  (1.07)  (-0.48) 
Log(Asset)
2
*REIT  -0.148  0.031 
  (-1.05)  (0.40) 
REIT -7.817 -9.964 5.882 3.053 
 (-1.20) (-1.10) (1.46) (0.72) 
MABidder -0.162 -0.176 0.022 0.028 
 (-1.29) (-1.39) (0.18) (0.24) 
MABiddert-1 0.279** 0.268** 0.160 0.163 
 (2.06) (1.97) (1.46) (1.52) 
Total Debt/ Total Cap -0.010 -0.008 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 (-1.13) (-0.88) (5.00) (5.26) 
ST Debt/ Debt -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.42) (-0.40) (0.60) (0.67) 
Asset Growth -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-4.67) (-4.61) (-4.49) (-4.39) 
Intercept 11.551** 11.584 7.694** 5.379 
 (2.50) (1.53) (2.13) (1.28) 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 
Adj. R2 0.369 0.367 0.506 0.502 
Note: The sample contains 232 firms and 2134 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2015. Log(EV) is the natural 
logarithm of the total enterprise value in million Euros. Log(Asset) is the natural logarithm of the total asset value in million 
Euros. ROE is the return on equity. Total Debt/ Total Cap is the book value of total debt as a percentage of the total 
capitalisation. ST Debt/ Debt is the ratio of the book value of short-term debt to the book value of total debt. Asset Growth 
is the growth in the book value of total assets over the previous year. Cost of debt is the interest expense as a percentage of 
the book value of the total debt. WACC is the weighted average cost of capital. REIT is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is a REIT in the current year. MABidder is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is an acquirer in the 




















This study set out to test the hypothesis that listed real estate companies enjoy positive size effects 
regarding their operational efficiency and profitability that outweigh the inefficiencies associated with 
large and complex internal structures.  The European listed real estate market provides a suitable 
laboratory for testing this hypothesis due to its size, heterogeneity and growth over the last two decades.  
Unlike in the US, REITs are a relatively recent phenomenon in Europe.  While the bulk of empirical 
evidence is on US REITs, this study investigates the effect of firm size on expense, revenue, return and 
capital cost for European real estate companies and compares the size effects of REITs and non-REIT real 
estate companies.  
 
To test for economies of scale, we use real estate company data from SNL database and focus on 
companies who invest primarily in Europe with a sample of 232 real estate companies over the 2001-15 
period. Employing panel data regression with fixed effects for geography, time and property type effects, 
we found that larger real estate companies are able to generate higher revenue per unit of company size, 
incur lower costs and produce higher returns. NOI ratios and return ratios increase while SG&A expense 
ratios decrease with the size of a company. We do not find evidence of larger companies having lower 
cost of debt or weighted average cost of capital.  
 
From our analysis, it is evident that particularly small firms can reap economies of scale as they grow. 
However, the benefits of further growth tend to be more modest for larger companies. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, there is no evidence that the group of the largest firms in our sample with total enterprise 
value over €6bn benefit at all from further growth regarding the metrics we investigated. 
 
Our results suggest that REITs have lower economies of scale in both expenses and revenues than Non-
REIT real estate companies. While the reasons for these differences warrant further investigation, we 
observe that REITs are on average larger than non-REITs which may limit the comparability of these two 
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